Security model

This section explains the security posture of using Portal and Agent-box together or separately.

Threat reduction goals

• Avoid broad host socket exposure to containers.
• Add policy gates to sensitive host operations.
• Provide audit-friendly mediation point.

Trust boundaries

• Container: untrusted or semi-trusted agent execution context.
• Portal host: trusted broker enforcing method policy.
• Host binaries (gh, wl-paste): executed only by host broker.

Control mechanisms

• Unix socket peer credentials for caller identity.
• Method-level policy modes (allow/ask/deny, gh_exec policy modes).
• Optional prompt-based approval command.
• Concurrency limits, rate limits, and request/prompt timeouts.
• Clipboard MIME allowlist and payload size limit.

Residual risks

• Misconfigured policy can allow broader access than intended.
• Prompt UX failures can degrade safety or usability.
• Host broker is a sensitive component and must be monitored and updated.

Operational guidance

• Keep policies explicit and minimal.
• Use deny-by-default for high-risk methods where appropriate.
• Enable debug logs during rollout and review outcomes.